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I. INTRODUCTION

Since 1980, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") guidelines have made employers liable for harassment
perpetrated by their agents and supervisory employees,1 and, in some
cases, for harassment occurring between co-workers in their employ.2
In 1991, Congress amended Title VII (the "Act") to provide
compensatory and punitive damages for victims of sexual
1.
The guidelines state that an employer is liable for sexual harassment perpetrated by
its agents or supervisory employees "regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were
authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or
should have known of their occurrence." EEOC, Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex,
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1994).
2.
The guidelines state that "[wiith respect to conduct between fellow employees, an
employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or
its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can
show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d).
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harassment. 3 The increased damages heightened the stakes in
lawsuits concerning employer liability for sexual harassment, and
thus provided increased incentives for employers to implement sexual
harassment policies and to discipline harassers.
The extant EEOC guidelines already had defined sexual
harassment broadly to include "verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature . . [when] such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." 4
The 1991 amendments thus aimed to transform personal interaction
between men and women in the workplace, not only in a supervisory
context but also between fellow workers. Responding to the urgings
of feminist intellectuals, 5 Congress created a statute-driven revolution
of gender attitudes in the workplace, a major victory for feminism.
Even as the amendments advanced the interests of feminists
in deterring harassment through increased compensation for victims,
however, Title VII's procedural protections continued to safeguard the
interests of employers charged with harassment under the Act.6 In
order to pursue a claim of sexual harassment, a woman 7 must first file
3.

Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072, codified at

42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1988 & Supp. 1994).
4.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
5.
See, for example, Deborah L. Rhode, Justice and Gender: Sex Discriminationand the
Law 235-36 (Harvard U., 1989) (advocating an expansion of liability for sexual harassment in
order to promote the adoption of new behavioral norms in place of sexually offensive ones);
Susan M. Mathews, Title WI and Sexual Harassment: Beyond Damages Control, 3 Yale J. L. &
Feminism 299, 302-04 (1991) (recommending adoption of an amendment to Title VII expanding
remedies for sexual harassment). In addition, well-known feminist legal scholar Catharine
MacKinnon was instrumental in securing a remedy for sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination under Title VII. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassmentof
Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination (Yale U., 1979). In advocating increased
remedies for sexual harassment victims, these feminists represented the interests of a much
larger group of workers. Many men and women favored the elimination of harassment in the
workplace, and everyone conceivably stood to benefit from a harassment-free workplace. This
Note, however, argues that the feminist leaders of this movement overlooked the interests of
those workers who are unfamiliar with these new norms. By exposing at-will workers accused
of sexual harassment to immediate discharge, regardless of actual guilt, prior track record, or
willingness to reform, feminists and legislators have created an arbitrary system which unnecessarily alienates individual workers and larger segments of the public.
6.
The EEOC guidelines imposing liability on employers for harassment perpetrated by
their agents and supervisors, regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of
the harassment, give employers strong incentive to seek procedural protection under Title VII.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c).
Although sexual harassment sometimes involves men as victims and women as
7.
perpetrators, the vast majority of persons filing sexual harassment claims with the EEOC are
women. See, for example, Barbara A. Gutek, Sex and the Workplace: The Impact of Sexual
Behaviorand Harassmenton Women, Men, and Organizations49 (Jossey-Bass, 1985) (reporting
that, of workers surveyed for a Los Angeles County Study, 21 to 53% of women, as compared to
nine to 37% of men, have experienced sexual harassment). Thus, for simplicity's sake, this Note
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a complaint with the EEOC. s The Act requires the EEOC to
investigate the charges and, upon a determination of reasonable

cause, to seek voluntary conciliation with the employer.9

If the

employer refuses to cooperate, the EEOC or the accuser may then
bring suit against it.1O Even under these circumstances, however,
Title VII guarantees the accused employer the right to litigate the
claim against it in the neutral forum of a federal court before
incurring any penalty." Just as feminists secured improved remedies
to compensate the victims and penalize the perpetrators of sexual
harassment, employers secured procedural protections to ensure that
2
they would receive fair hearings before incurring any penalties.
In its effort to accommodate feminists and employers, however,
Congress overlooked the interests of one key group-the
3
predominantly working-class men at whom the statute was aimed.
Title VII's prohibition of sexual harassment represents a dramatic
departure from pre-existing workplace norms.
While the new
behavioral norms may appear obvious to the feminist intellectuals
who promoted them, they are far from obvious to the male and female
workers who must learn to live by them. 4 Nonetheless, the current
statutory scheme demands immediate and flawless compliance with
the Act and provides no procedural protections to ensure that workers
refers to alleged harassers with masculine nouns and pronouns and to complainants of
harassmement with feminine nouns and pronouns.
8.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1988 & Supp. 1991 and 1992).
9.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1988).
12. Some scholars have argued that employers receive excessive procedural protection
under Title VII's conciliation process. Characterizing the process as a series of hoops through
which an alleged victim must jump in order to obtain relief, these scholars argue that the
process unduly hinders and discourages victims from pursuing their claims. See, for example,
Nancy Levit, Preemption of Section 1983 by Title I: An Unwarranted Deprivation of
Remedies, 15 Hofstra L. Rev. 265, 294-95 (1987) (favoring Section 1983 over Title VII as an
enforcement mechanism because of the "administrative hoops" through which a Title VII
complainant must jump).
13. It is true that supervisory employees and co-workers may receive a hearing during the
EEOC conciliation process and in federal court when an alleged victim pursues a complaint
against her employer, charging vicarious liability for harassment perpetrated by one of these
employees. A positive or negative outcome at these hearings, however, affects only the employer's liability under Title VII and in no way restricts the employer's ability to fire at-will
employees accused of harassment. Putting to one side this tangential procedural protection
afforded employees in the context of employer liability, this Note focuses exclusively on the
penalties that employees accused of harassment may incur at the hands of their employers.
14. See, for example, Young v. Hobart Brothers Co., 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 141, *23
(upholding an employer's discharge of a worker for sexual harassment even though both the
alleged harasser and the alleged victim characterized the incident at hand as a joke rather than
as sexual harassment).
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accused of harassment receive either a fair hearing or an appropriate
15
penalty.
This lack of procedural protection for alleged harassers is
especially troubling in the context of at-will employment. While
workers in union and government settings typically receive a full
range of procedural protections akin to those guaranteed employers
under Title VII,16 workers in at-will settings may be fired for any
reason, good or bad, or for no reason at all. 17 Injected into the at-will
context are EEOC guidelines insulating employers from liability for
known harassment between fellow workers so long as employers take
"immediate and appropriate corrective action."' 8 With the EEOC
guidelines on one hand and the lack of procedural protection for atwill workers on the other, employers have little incentive to invest
resources in investigating claims and providing hearings for alleged
harassers, and have great incentive to fire them immediately.
Far from advancing the goals of Title VII, the immediate firing
of a worker accused of sexual harassment may very well embitter the
worker and more deeply entrench his pre-existing biases against
women in the workplace. Because the accused worker loses his job
regardless of whether he regrets his behavior or refuses to acknowledge fault, the worker has little incentive to learn from prior mistakes
and reform himself. Moreover, the stakes for the worker charged
with harassment are high. Not only does immediate discharge for
sexual harassment deprive the worker of his livelihood, the worker
may also suffer serious repercussions in his search for a new job, in
his familial relationships, and in his standing in the community. 9

15. Neither the Act itself nor its legislative history alludes to the effect of Title VII on alleged individual perpetrators of harassment or discrimination in the workplace.
16. See Michael D. Fabiano, Note, The Meaning of Just Cause for Termination When an
Employer Alleges Misconduct and the Employee Denies It, 44 Hastings L. J. 399, 401-02 (1993)
(noting that most collective bargaining agreements and civil service systems have just-cause
limits on an employer's ability to discharge employees). See also notes 57-61 and accompanying
text.
17. See Richard Harrison Winters, Note, Employee Handbooks and Employment-at-Will
Contracts, 1985 Duke L. J. 196, 197-200 (describing the background of the employment-at-will
doctrine); Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L. Rev.
631, 647-63, 680-85 (1988) (discussing common law exceptions to the at-will doctrine and arguing for a new presumption under which employers must justify their termination of employees
who have passed a probationary period). See also notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
18. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d). While employers may insulate themselves from liability by
taking corrective action with respect to fellow employees, no subsequent action will insulate
employers from liability for harassment perpetrated by their agents or employee supervisors.
Thus, the incentive for employers to respond to charges of harassment by firing alleged perpetrators may be stronger with respect to co-workers than with respect to agents and supervisors.
19. See In re King Soopers, Inc. and United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 86
Labor Arb. (BNA) 254, 258 (1985) (Sass, Arbitrator) (noting that the charge may attach a social
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As the number of workers fired for harassment without a hearing or any objective determination of guilt increases, the public's focus
may well shift from the victims of sexual harassment to the injustice
suffered by alleged harassers.20 Feminists and legislators who seek to
change the public's perception of women in the workplace thus also
have an interest in providing procedural protections to assure alleged
harassers fair treatment and promote on-the-job reform. In order to
promote the public's commitment to eliminating sexual harassment
over the long term, to increase incentives for employers to invest in
sound sexual harassment policies, and to encourage reform on the
part of workers, Congress and the courts should increase the procedural protections available to alleged harassers in at-will settings.
Just as Title VII protects the interest of employers in receiving a fair
hearing before incurring monetary penalties under the Act, Title VII
should protect the interest of workers in receiving a fair hearing
before losing their jobs for alleged violations of the Act.
Accepting as given the enormous value to be gained from
eliminating sexual harassment in the workplace, this Note compares
the procedural protections available to employers under Title VII with
those available to workers in just cause, due process, and at-will employment settings. Part II traces the structural development of Title
VII, examining the ways in which this structure has continued to
protect the interests of employers in receiving a fair hearing even as it
has gradually increased the enforcement mechanisms and remedies
available to alleged victims of harassment. Part III describes the
procedural protections available to individual alleged harassers under
just cause and due process systems, concluding that these settings
provide protections for workers similar to those that Title VII prostigma that could be damaging to the accused's standing in the community); Ashway v.
Ferrellgas,Inc., 59 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 375, 377 n.6 (1989) (noting that a charge can impair a
person's ability to earn a livelihood, and can harm his reputation); Barbara Lindemann and
David D. Kadue, Sexual Harassment in Employment Law 526 (BNA, 1992) (stating that a
charge may hurt the accused's reputation within the company, community, and industry in
which he works). An employee would probably encounter similar difficulties if fired for committing any crime, such as pilfering funds from the company cashbox. Sexual harassment is
distinct from these crimes, however, because of the new behavioral norms imposed by Title VII.
While our society's prohibitions against stealing and other crimes have been in place for a long
time and reflect relatively well-understood behavioral norms, Title ViI's prohibition of sexual
harassment represents a recent effort to dramatically change behavioral norms. This normative
change argues for greater protections on behalf of alleged harassers, who may not fully understand the new behavioral code before incurring a penalty under it.
20. See, for example, Kathieen Murray, At Work; A Backlash on Harassment Cases, N.Y.
Times 3-23 (Sept. 18, 1994) (describing the recent increase in lawsuits brought by alleged
harassers in an effort to clear their names).

1024

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1019

vides for employers. Part IV describes the procedural protections
available to at-will workers and concludes that no appropriate procedural protections exist to assure that such workers accused of harassment receive fair hearings and just penalties. Part IV further
describes the injustice that results from this lack of protection and its
potential dangers. Finally, Part V suggests that providing greater
procedural protection for at-will workers accused of sexual harassment would create a balance of interests more closely akin to that
achieved by Title VII between alleged victims and employers, thus
respecting the interests of workers and encouraging on-the-job reform
of inappropriate behaviors and attitudes toward women in the workplace.
II. TITLE VII: BALANCING INTERESTS OF VICTIM ADVOCATES IN
OBTAINING COMPLIANCE AND OF EMPLOYERS IN
RECEIVING FAIR HEARINGS

Since the initial passage of Title VII in 1964, Congress has
attempted to accommodate the interests of civil rights advocates and
employees encountering discrimination on the one hand, and the
interests of employers accused of discrimination on the other. The
original 1964 Act addressed both interests primarily by creating the
EEOC conciliation process 2' and by creating a cause of action under
which victims of discrimination could obtain damages if the conciliation process failed to resolve the issue.22 Because the 88th Congress
viewed employment discrimination as a" 'human' problem" occurring

21. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(a), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 249, codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988 & Supp. 1994).
22. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(e), 78 Stat. at 260. In addition, § 707 gave the Attorney
General authority to bring a civil action in response to a pattern or practice of discrimination.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 707(a), 78 Stat. at 261-62. Between 1965 and 1971, the Attorney
General brought only 57 suits on behalf of employees encountering pattern or practice discrimination. Although the small number of suits enabled the Attorney General and the Justice
Department to achieve their goals of establishing key precedent, this strategy failed to secure
individual relief for the larger number of employees experiencing this type of discrimination.
Minna J. Kotkin, Public Remedies for Private Wrongs: Rethinking the Title WI Back Pay
Remedy, 41 Hastings L. J. 1301, 1322 (1990).
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in isolated incidents, 23 it believed informal conciliation and voluntary
compliance constituted the most effective means of ending discrimination.24

Upon receipt of a complaint, the EEOC was to provide the
employer with a copy of the charge and perform an investigation to
determine whether it merited further action. 25 If the investigation
provided reasonable cause to believe that the charge was true, the
EEOC would then attempt to eliminate the unlawful practice through
'informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.26 If
the EEOC failed to achieve voluntary compliance within thirty days,
the aggrieved employee could bring an independent Title VII action
against the employer in federal court.27 The 1964 Act thus protected
the employer's interests by providing an opportunity to resolve
charges voluntarily and, if conciliation efforts failed,28 by providing an
opportunity to litigate the charges against it in federal court. The Act
likewise protected the alleged victim's interests by encouraging voluntary conciliation with the employer and, if conciliation efforts failed,

23. The House Report in support of subsequent amendments to Title VII in 1972 characterized Congress' view of employment discrimination in 1964 "as a series of isolated and distinguishable events, due, for the most part, to ill-will on the part of some identifiable individual or
organization. It was thought that a scheme which stressed conciliation rather than compulsory
processes would be more appropriate for the resolution of this essentially 'human' problem."
H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972), in 1972 U.S.C.C-A.N. 2137, 2144.
24. See Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (stating "Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to assure equality of employment opportunities by
eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. Cooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred
means for achieving this goal" (citations omitted)).
25. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(a), 78 Stat. at 249. The purpose of the preliminary
investigation was to determine whether "there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is
true." Id.
26. Id. Conciliation agreements often include remedies to make the grievant whole, such
as back pay, and to promote compliance with the Act, such as reporting and afinrmative action.
Lawrence Allen Katz, Investigation and Conciliation of Employment DiscriminationCharges
Under Title VII: Employers'Rightsin an Adversary Process, 28 Hastings L. J. 877, 916 (1977).
Conciliation agreements bind only the parties who have consented to them in writing. Id. at
915. Thus, the EEOC, the employee grievant, and the employer charged with harassment must
all execute the agreement to ensure effective resolution of the dispute. Id.
27. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(e), 78 Stat. at 260.
28. Under the current Civil Rights Act, as amended in 1972 and 1991, if the EEOC is
unable to reach a settlement agreement within 180 days, it then issues a letter authorizing the
complainant to bring suit within 90 days after the issuance of the letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(1). Due to a substantial backlog of cases, the EEOC is unable to attempt conciliation in the
vast majority of cases; so enforcement of Title VII falls primarily on individual complainants to
bring suit independently. See Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An
EconomicAnalysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 563, 603-04 (1988).
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by creating a cause of action through which the victim could force
compliance and receive compensation.29

Some supporters of the 1964 Act initially recommended that
the EEOC be given power either to bring suit on behalf of private
citizens or to adjudicate disputes between accused employers and
their accusers. 0 In order to secure passage of the Act, these supporters agreed to adopt neither proposal and instead limited the EEOC's
role to that of conciliator.31 Explaining the rationale of those who
favored the withholding of adjudicative power, Congressman William
M. McCulloch argued that the federal court system would provide
employers with a fairer forum in which to contest charges against
them.3 2 By channeling Title VII litigation to the federal courts,
Congress sought to place accused employers and their accusers on a
level playing field to prevent bias leading to unjust results. Had this
proven correct, the conciliation process would have fully
accommodated both civil rights advocates' interests in enforcing
compliance with the Act and employers' interests in receiving fair
hearings before incurring penalties.
It soon became apparent, however, that the balance struck in
1964 tilted too heavily toward accused employers. Between the initial
passage of Title VII in 1964 and 1972, the EEOC resolved less than
3
half of the cases recommended for investigation through conciliation. 3
Instead of cooperating with the EEOC to resolve charges against
them, employers ignored the conciliation process and relied, often
successfully, on the assumption that aggrieved employees would fail
to litigate their claims independently. 34 In fact, less than ten percent
of aggrieved employees brought suit independently when the EEOC

29. See Robert Belton, A ComparativeReview of Public and PrivateEnforcement of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 Vand. L. Rev. 905, 907-08, 817, 961 (1978) (describing the
role of private litigation in the enforcement of Title VII and development of legal precedent in
this area).
30. See, for example, Kotkin, 41 Hastings L. J. at 1315 (cited in note 22); Laurie M.
Stegman, Note, An AdministrativeBattle of the Forms: The EEOC's Intake Questionnaireand
Chargeof Discrimination,91 Mich. L. Rev. 124, 131-32 (1992).
31. See Kotkin, 41 Hastings L. J. at 1315-17 (describing the initial Senate and House
proposals which both provided for EEOC enforcement power and the compromise which resulted
in the 1964 scheme).
32. H.R. Rep. No. 914,88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391,2487, 251516 (Additional Views of Honorable William M. McCulloch, et al.). See also Stegman, 91 Mich. L.
Rev. at 132 (cited in note 30) (noting that Congress viewed the federal courts as "the fairer,
more appropriate arbiters on the sensitive question of employment discrimination!).
33. H.R. Rep. No. 238, in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2144 (cited in note 23).
34. Id.
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failed in its conciliation efforts. 35 Because the EEOC had no means of

directly enforcing compliance with Title VII, employers had little
reason to change their practices voluntarily.36
Amendments to Title VII in 1972 granted the EEOC power to

bring suit on behalf of aggrieved individuals, 37 thus providing a counterweight to offset the substantial protections afforded accused em-

ployers under the 1964 Act. Continuing nonetheless its protection of
the accused employers' interests, Congress retained Title VII's emphasis on voluntary compliance through conciliation and made the
conciliation procedure a prerequisite to any suit brought by the

EEOC. 38 EEOC enforcement power thus functioned as an incentive
for employers to comply with the conciliation process, rather than as a
39
replacement for the process.

35. Kotkin, 41 Hastings L. J. at 1322 (cited in note 22). But see Belton, 31 Vand. L. Rev.
at 961 (cited in note 29) (arguing that scholars have underestimated the impact of private
litigation on enforcement of Title VII).
36. H.R. Rep. No. 238, in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2144 (cited in note 23). The additional
means of enforcement provided under the 1964 Act through pattern or practice cases brought by
the Attorney General also proved to be of little consequence. See note 22 (noting that, from
1965 to 1971, the Attorney General brought only 57 suits charging pattern or practice discrimination).
37. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 706(f)(1), Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat.
103, 105 codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(fi(l) (1994). For a detailed description of the legislative history pertaining to the passage of the 1972 amendments, see George P. Sape and Thomas
J. Hart, Title VII Reconsidered The Equal Employment OpportunityAct of 1972,40 Gee. Wash.
L. Rev. 824, 836-46 (1972).
38. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 706(f)(1), 86 Stat. at 105. See also
Katz, 28 Hastings L. J. at 916 (cited in note 26) (stating that an attempt at conciliation is a
'jurisdictional prerequisite" to any suit brought under Title VII by the EEOC); Sape and Hart,
40 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 862-64 (summarizing the procedure for filing a complaint as required
by the 1972 amendments); Note, Judicial Responses to the EEOC's Failure to Attempt
Conciliation, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 433, 434-37 (1982) (arguing that when courts refuse to hear a
Title VII case because the EEOC failed to attempt conciliation, they should dismiss the case
without prejudice rather than grant summary judgment for the defendant).
39. See Firefightersv. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 515 (1986) (noting that Congress intended
the objectives of Title VII to be met through voluntary compliance); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC,
458 U.S. 219, 228 (1982) (stating that rules implementing Title VII should seek to bring
defendants into voluntary compliance); Note, 81 Mich. L. Rev. at 441-42 (noting that the
amended Act provides employees greater incentives to comply voluntarily). See also Katz, 28
Hastings L. J. at 879 (stating that the EEOC's ability to bring suit under the 1972 amendments
"undoubtedly increased its credibility with employers and ... substantially augmented its
ability to investigate and conciliate charges of discrimination"); Sape and Hart, 40 Go. Wash. L.
Rev. at 846 (noting Congress' intention to retain all principles in the 1964 Act not explicitly
altered by the 1972 amendments). But see Wayne E. McDowell, Note, Title WI-The Tolling of
the Accrual of Back Pay Liability by the Tender of an Unconditional Job Offer Without
RetroactiveSeniority: Ford Motor Company v. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, 27
Howard L. J. 575, 594-95 (1984) (arguing that Congress intended to replace the conciliation
process with EEOC enforcement powers when it enacted the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act in 1972).
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Under the 1972 amendments, aggrieved employees retained
the right to bring suit independently in federal court against their
employers after the EEOC had exhausted its efforts at conciliation.40
By again withholding adjudicative power from the EEOC, Congress
continued to provide employers with the procedural protection of a
neutral forum in which to litigate these claims. 41 Thus, even if an
employer refused to cooperate during conciliation proceedings or if the
42
EEOC's backlog of cases prevented it from attempting conciliation,
the employer had a full opportunity to refute the charges against it
before incurring liability. Moreover, in determining appropriate
penalties for employers who had violated the Act, courts considered
the egregiousness of the employer's offense, the employer's prior track
record of compliance with the Act, and the employer's apparent willingness to change its behavior. 43 The 1972 scheme thus continued to
protect the interests of accused employers in receiving a fair hearing
and incurring a fair penalty, even as it provided accusers with greater
enforcement power.
By the early 1990s, Congress recognized that it had still not
struck an even balance between employers accused of discrimination
and their accusers. The 1964 and 1972 Acts had provided equitable
remedies of injunction, reinstatement, and backpay to compensate
40. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 706(f)(1), 86 Stat. at 105. See also Sape
and Hart, 40 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 879-80 (discussing congressional recognition of the
importance of an independent right to sue). As discussed in note 28, because of the substantial
backlog of cases filed, the EEOC was often unable to pursue its initial investigation and
conciliatory efforts before the allotted time period expired. Most complainants thus received
permission to bring suit independently. See Sykes, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 603-04 (cited in note
28). Available remedies included injunction, reinstatement, backpay, and "other equitable
relief." Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 706(g), 86 Stat. at 107. One scholar has
argued that courts could reasonably have read the phrase "other equitable relief" as giving
courts broader latitude to award appropriate damages, rather than as restricting damages to
those of a purely equitable character. Kotkln, 41 Hastings L. J. at 1325-27 (cited in note 22).
41. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 706(f)(3), 86 Stat. at 106 (granting
jurisdiction over Title VII actions to United States district courts and United States courts "of a
place subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S.").
42. See note 28 (discussing the inability of the EEOC to attempt conciliation due to case
backlog).
43. See, for example, Bahadirli v. Domino's Pizza, 873 F. Supp. 1528, 1535 (M.D. Ala.
1995) (citing Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 231-32) (stating that an employer's liability for back
pay ceases as of the moment it unconditionally offers to provide a job, and noting that this rule
stems from a policy of encouraging voluntary compliance with Title VII); Saxton v. AT&T, 10
F.3d 526, 535 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that an employer incurs no liability under Title VII when
it takes "prompt and appropriate remedial action upon discovering [co-worker] harassment");
Hudson v. Soft Sheen Products,873 F. Supp. 132, 136 (E.D. IM. 1995) (noting that the legislative
history to Title VII indicates that compensatory and punitive damages are available only in
certain cases: compensatory damages are available if the employer's acts were intentional, and
punitive damages are available if the employer acts with malice or with reckless or callous
indifference).
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victims of harassment and other forms of discrimination for their
injuries. 44 Although these remedies provided some relief for those
who responded to harassment or discrimination by quitting their jobs,
it left those who "continued working with no meaningful remedy besides injunction.45 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provided these workers with compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional
discrimination.46

Some members of Congress feared that the availability of compensatory and punitive damages would detract from the conciliatory
goals of Title VII, 47 thus tilting the Act too heavily in favor of accusers.

They argued that, given a free choice of whether to pursue settlement
through arbitration or tort damages through litigation, most plaintiffs
would choose litigation. 48 Other members responded to this concern
by noting that, despite the long-time availability of compensatory and
punitive damages for racial discrimination under 28 U.S.C. § 1981,
complainants had consistently pursued both damages under Section
1981 and conciliation proceedings under Title VII. 49
44. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g), 86 Stat. at 107; Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, § 706(g), 78 Stat. at 261.
45. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(11), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), in 1991 U.S.C.C.AN. 694,
718-21 (recounting stories of discrimination victims who were inadequately compensated);
Kotkin, 41 Hastings L. J. at 1357 (cited in note 22) (discussing the lack of monetary relief under
the post-1972 version of Title VII). When Congress passed the 1991 Act, it listed improved
remedies for harassment as one of its four primary goals. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 3, 105 Stat.
at 1071.
46. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102, 105 Stat. at 1072. The Act achieved this outcome by
extending compensatory and punitive damages to victims of all types of intentional
discrimination prohibited by Title VII. Id. The Act defines "intentional discrimination" to mean
"not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact." Id. For an
argument that compensatory and punitive damages should also be allowed for disparate impact
and mixed-motive claims, see Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. 921, 947-50 (1993).
47. H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), in 1991 U.S.C.C.AN. 549, 671-75
(Minority Views). The minority feared that the availability of tort remedies would "transform
Title VII from a statute rightfully focused on the prompt resolution of disputes through settlement and conciliation and the repair of the employment relationship ... to a litigation and
attorneys' fee generating machine." Id. at 676. See also H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(11), in 1991
U.S.C.CJLN. at 758-59 (cited in note 45) (Dissenting Views of Honorable Henry J. Hyde, et al.)
(arguing that the proposed amendments would shift the focus of Title VII from conciliation and
preservation of the employment relationship to litigation); Cynthia L. Alexander, Note, The
Defeat of the Civil Rights Act of 1990: Wading Through the Rhetoric in Search of Compromise,
44 Vand. L. Rev. 595, 623-25 (1991) (arguing that a provision for compensatory and punitive
damages may have the undesireable effect of undermining the conciliatory focus of Title VII).
48. H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(I), in 1991 U.S.C.C.N. at 672.
49. H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(W), in 1991 U.S.C.C.N. at 611-12. The majority report favoring
the new provision for tort remedies stated: "Of course, expanding Title VII's remedial scheme to
permit recovery of damages in cases of intentional discrimination would neither Jettison' nor
'scuttle' any of the statute's existing remedial or conciliation procedures [as opponents of tort
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Moreover, Section 116 of the 1991 Act explicitly provides that
the amendments do not detract from the validity of conciliation
agreements in any way.50 The 1991 amendments also incorporate
caps on compensatory and punitive damages to retain a balance between incentives for complainants to litigate and incentives to settle
under the conciliation procedures. 51 Thus, neither supporters nor
opponents of the provision for compensatory and punitive damages
intended their availability to negate the conciliatory framework so
52
central to the 1964 and-1972 Acts.

Even if the 1991 Act's provision for compensatory and punitive
damages results in accusers forsaking the Title VII conciliation process in favor of litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a balance between
the interests of the accused employer and its accuser will nonetheless
continue; even if accusers circumvent the entire conciliation process,
they must still litigate their claims in federal court in order to impose
liability on an employer. 53 The neutrality of this forum continues to
protect the interests of accused employers in fairly determining guilt
54
and imposing penalties even as the stakes of liability increase.
remedies feared). Such procedures would continue to be available, and victims of intentional
discrimination would continue to use them." Id. at 611. See also H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(11), in
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 722 (cited in note 45) (stating that an award of tort remedies in
intentional discrimination cases will not subvert the conciliation process).
50. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 116, 105 Stat. at 1079. Section 116 reads: "Nothing in the
amendments made by this title shall be construed to affect court-ordered remedies, affirmative
action, or conciliation agreements, [sic) that are in accordance with the law." Id. Thus, in
addition to leaving the conciliation provisions untouched, the 1991 Act explicitly states that
agreements reached through the conciliation process should continue to govern parties to an
EEOC complaint.
51. Id., § 102, 105 Stat. at 1072. See also H.R. Rep. No. 102-40a1), in 1991 U.S.C.C-.AN.
at 760 (cited in note 45) (arguing that recently defeated amendments to the 1991 Act providing
for a cap on compensatory and punitive damages, which eventually passed, would reinforce the
conciliatory aspects of Title VII). But see Belton, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. at 947 (cited in note 46)
(arguing for a removal of the statutory caps on compensatory and punitive damages in order to
more effectively deter discriminatory behavior on the part of employers and more fully
compensate victims of discrimination).
52. Also indicative of Congress' intent to retain the conciliatory focus of the Act is the
rationale presented in the House Report for overturning the Supreme Court's holding in Martin
v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), which permitted collateral attacks on settlement agreements.
H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(1), in 1991 U.S.C.CAN. at 589-91 (cited in note 47). Noting that "[olne of
Title VIi's goals is the encouragement of voluntary settlements as the 'preferred means' of
resolving employment discrimination disputes," the report then reasoned that the Wilks rule
should be overturned to provide permanence and stability to settlement agreements. Id. But
see Major Charles B. Hernicz, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: From Conciliationto LitigationHow Congress Delegates Lawmaking to the Courts, 141 Milit. L. Rev. 1, 4, 81 (1993) (arguing
that in enacting the 1991 amendments, Congress unwisely shifted the focus of the Act from
conciliation to litigation).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).
54. The 1991 Act gives those complaining parties seeking compensatory or punitive
damages the right to a jury trial if they demand one. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(c) (1988 & Supp.
1994). To the extent that juries may be biased in favor of either the complaining party or the
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For the worker charged with sexual harassment, however,
Title VII lacks any procedural safeguards designed to protect his
interest in receiving a fair hearing and appropriate penalty at the
hands of his employer. With no statutory procedures in place, the
procedural protections available to alleged harassers vary according
to employment setting. Parts III and IV discuss the procedural protections available to workers in union, government, and at-will settings.
III. THE JUST CAUSE STANDARD AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS:
BALANCING INTERESTS OF EMPLOYEES ACCUSED OF
HARASSMENT AND THEIR ACCUSERS

Since the late nineteenth century, American common law has
presumed employment relationships of indefinite duration to be at

employer charged with discrimination, federal court may not constitute a completely "neutral"

forum. Nonetheless, a jury trial in federal court is still likely to provide a more neutral forum in
which to litigate claims of discrimination than would adjudication by the EEOC, the agency
charged with enforcing compliance with Title VII. See note 32 and accompanying text
(discussing Congressman McCulloch's view regarding the fairness of the federal courts as a

forum).
It is worth noting that in extending coverage of Title VII to Senate employees under the
1991 Act, Senators gave themselves procedural protections closely resembling those available to
employers under Title Vll's conciliation process. Civil Rights Act of 1991, §§ 301-317, 105 Stat.
1088-96. In order to obtain Title VII remedies, a Senate employee alleging sexual harassment
against a Senator or member of a Senator's staff must first request counseling by the Office of
Senate Fair Employment Practices ("OSFEP"). Government Employee Rights Act of 1991, 2
U.S.C. § 1205 (1988 & Supp. 1994). In order to pursue the complaint further, the employee
must then request mediation with the OSFEP "for the purpose of resolving the dispute between
the employee and the employing office." 2 U.S.C. § 1206(a) (Supp. 1994). The mediation period
continues for thirty days and may be extended for an additional thirty days at the OSFEP's
discretion. 2 U.S.C. § 1206(b). Only after exhaustion of the counseling and mediation
provisions is the employee entitled to a formal hearing and award of Title VII remedies against
the offending party, if the hearing board finds in favor of the employee. 2. U.S.C. § 1207 (Supp.
1994). The hearing board is composed of three independent hearing officers who are not
Senators, Officers, or employees of the Senate and who are designated by the Director of the
OSFEP. Id. Decisions of the hearing board are reviewable by the Select Committee on Ethics
and by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1208-1209 (Supp. 1994).
See also 137 Cong. Rec. S.15348, 15386 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991) (statement of Sen. Chafee)
(summarizing the proposed procedure for Senate employees pursuing allegations of sexual
harassment against a Senator).
Like an employer subject to Title VIIs conciliation procedures, any Senator or staff member
charged with sexual harassment has a full opportunity to resolve the charges voluntarily before
submitting to a hearing at which he may incur liability under Title VII. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1205-1206.
Moreover, in the event that counseling or mediation fails, both Senators and their staff
members are entitled to a full hearing to determine liability and the appropriate remedy. 2
U.S.C. §§ 1207-1209.
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will. 55 An employer may thus fire a worker for any reason, good or

bad, or for no reason at all .56 Union and government employment
constitute two major exceptions to the at-will rule.57 When union

workers negotiate collective bargaining agreements with their employers, they focus primarily on increasing job security,58 typically
through adoption of a 'Just cause" standard for discharge. 59 The
Federal Civil Service Reform Act of 197860 and analogous state statutes 61 place similar for-cause limitations on the firing of most government workers.62

State and federal government employees who do not receive
protection under the Civil Service Reform Act or an analogous state
statute have constitutional due process protection through the Fifth
and Fourteenth amendments if they can demonstrate a liberty or
property interest in their jobs.63 Due process entitles such workers to
notice of the reasons for discharge and a hearing either for the purpose of refuting the charges or for the purpose of clearing their names
if the charge was stigmatizing.6 In addition, government employees

55. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., 1 Employee DismissalLaw and Practice§§ 1.1, 1.4 at 3, 1015 (Wiley, 3d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1992) (discussing the development and recent erosion of the
employment-at-will doctrine). For a discussion of the rule's origin, see Leonard, 66 N.C. L. Rev.
at 640-41 (cited in note 17); Jack M. Beermann and Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions
in Legal Reasoning: The Exdmple of Property in Jobs, 23 Ga. L. Rev. 911, 920-22 (1989); Note,
ProtectingAt Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good
Faith,93 Harv. L. Rev. 1816, 1824-25 (1980).
56. Leonard, 66 N.C. L. Rev. at 632; Fabiano, 44 Hastings L. J. at 401 (cited in note 16).
57. Note, 93 Harv. L. Rev. at 1816 (cited in note 55); Leonard, 66 N.C. L. Rev. at 632-33;
Fabiano, 44 Hastings L. J. at 401-02.
58. Roger I. Abrams and Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of "JustCause" in Employee
DisciplineCases, 1985 Duke L. J. 594, 599.
59. Id. A study conducted by the Bureau of National Affairs found that 86 percent of 400
union-management agreements studied contained a "cause" or "just cause" provision. Bureau of
National Affairs, BasicPatternsin Union Contracts 7 (BNA, 12th ed. 1989).
60. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7521, 7701-7703 (1988 & Supp. 1989, & Supp. 1990).
61. See Perritt, 2 Employee Dismissal § 6.5 at 10-13 (cited in note 55) (summarizing
statutory and regulatory just cause provisions for state government employees).
62. Fabiano, 44 Hastings L. J. at 413 (cited in note 16). Fabiano classifies the standard of
proof for firing government employees covered by the Civil Service Reform Act as the most
demanding level of just cause analysis. Instead of allowing either a government supervisor's
good faith belief of employee misconduct or finding of substantial evidence supporting allegations of employee misconduct to constitute 'just cause," the Act requires a finding of actual
misconduct. Id. Most state government employees receive similar protection under state civil
service regulations. Id.
63. See, for example, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985)
(stating that "[r]espondents' federal constitutional claim depends on their having had a property
right in continued employment"); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 57678 (1972) (discussing respondent's need to show a liberty or property interest in his job). For a
general discussion of the constitutional due process rights afforded government employees, see
Developments in the Law: Public Employment, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1611, 1780-1800 (1984).
64. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546; Roth, 408 U.S. at 569-70.
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may receive a hearing if their case implicates some other constitutional provision, such as the Equal Protection Clause or the First
65
Amendment.
In contrast, private sector workers who are not parties to collective bargaining agreements receive very little procedural protection
under the common law at-will doctrine.66 Many courts, however, have
modified the at-will doctrine in recent years by (1) recognizing express
or implied contracts in certain factual situations; (2) recognizing a
public policy exception; and (3) in a few jurisdictions, implying a duty
of good faith and fair dealing into all employment relationships.6 7
Nonetheless, because the procedural protections available to at-will
workers differ so substantially from those available to workers under
just cause and due process systems, discussion of at-will employment
is reserved for Part IV. Part III will now provide a detailed description of the procedural protections available to workers under just
cause systems and to government workers who establish a claim for
constitutional protection.
A Union and Government Employment with
Just Cause Limits on Firing
The just cause standard provides union employees and civil
servants charged with sexual harassment procedural protections
similar to those extended to employers under Title VII. For instance,
the just cause standard entitles alleged harassers to a preliminary
investigation into the charges against them. 68 Like employers under65. See, for example, Black v. City of Auburn, 857 F. Supp. 1540 (M.D. Ala. 1994)
(considering an alleged harasser's claims under the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection
Clause, and the First Amendment).
66. Leonard, 66 N.C. L. Rev. at 632 (cited in note 17); Fabiano, 44 Hastings L. J. at 401
(cited in note 16).
67. See Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public
Policy Exception, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1931, 1935-37 (1983) (describing exceptions to the at-will rule
and citing pertinent cases); Leonard, 66 N.C. L. Rev. at 635-36 (same). Federal and state
legislation, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1988 & Supp. 1994), the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§
141-197 (1988 & Supp. 1994), the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988
& Supp. 1994), and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1140
(1988 & Supp. 1994), place additional restrictions on private sector discharge. Note, 96 Harv. L.
Rev. at 1934; Leonard, 66 N.C. L. Rev. at 632-33.
68. See In re Heublein, Inc. and Teamsters Local Union No. 283, 88 Labor Arb. (BNA)
1292, 1295 (1987) (Ellmann, Arbitrator) (explaining that a provision for just cause discharge
entitles an employee to reasonable advance notice of the charges against him, a reasonable and
objective investigation in which the employee is permitted to explain his side of the story, and a
finding of guilt supported by credible evidence); In re DeVry Institute of Technology and
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going an EEOC investigation under Title VII, alleged harassers subject to just cause discharge have an opportunity to present their side
of the story and to challenge the discipline imposed. 9 In addition, the
employer must support a finding of guilt and any resulting penalty
with credible evidence. 70 In the same way that the EEOC may not
proceed against an employer under Title VII until it has determined
that reasonable cause exists to believe the allegations, 71 an employer
worker until it has
subject to just cause limits may not discipline a 72
charge.
the
support
to
evidence
discovered credible
This investigatory procedure, however, carries much greater
significance for the alleged harasser in a just cause employment setting than for an employer charged with harassment under Title VII.
If the EEOC is unable to investigate a claim due to its substantial
backlog of cases, the individual grievant may still pursue it by filing
the case in federal court.7 3 If the court determines that the employer

violated Title VII, it will impose liability despite the fact that no preliminary investigation ever occurred. 74
On the other hand, if an employer fails to investigate a charge
properly under a just cause system, this procedural defect often renders illegitimate any penalty imposed on the alleged harasser by the
employer7 5 Procedural defects in the just cause setting sometimes
predominate over substantive concerns regarding the actual guilt or
innocence of the alleged harasser, resulting in reinstatement of em-

Individual Grievant,87 Labor Arb. (BNA) 1149, 1157 (1986) (Berman, Arbitrator) (stating that
basic due process requires an employer to inform the employee of charges against him, notify
the employee of evidence so that he may respond, and investigate the charges within a reasonable period); Adolph M. Koven and Susan L. Smith, Just Cause: The Seven Tests 180-81 (BNA
Books, 1992) (stating that an employee subject to just cause provisions has the right to be
informed of the charges against him, to confront his accusers, to present evidence in his defense,
and to receive legal counsel).
69. In re Heublein, 88 Labor Arb. (BNA) at 1295; In re DeVry Institute, 87 Labor Arb.
(BNA) at 1157; Koven and Smith, Just Cause at 182.
70. In re Heublein, 88 Labor Arb. (BNA) at 1295. If the employer warns an employee that
he must cease a certain type of misconduct, the employer cannot later fire the employee for
misconduct that preceded this warning. In re DeVry Institute, 87 Labor Arb. (BNA) at 1158.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
72. In re Heublein, 88 Labor Arb. (BNA) at 1295.
73. See note 28 and accompanying text.
74. Although an EEOC investigation and attempt at conciliation is a prerequisite to the
EEOC bringing suit, it is not a prerequisite to the individual claimant bringing suit. See note
28 and accompanying text.
75. See In re Heublein, 88 Labor Arb. (BNA) at 1296 n.2 (noting that "[a] discharge
violative of procedural protections cannot stand"); Federated Dept. Stores v. United Food &
Commercial Workers Union, 901 F.2d 1494, 1495 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding reinstatement of
employees when the employer gave them no opportunity to respond to the charges against
them).
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In this respect, workers in a

just cause setting receive greater procedural protection than do employers under Title VII.
Moreover, when arbitrators consider whether an employer had
just cause to fire or otherwise discipline a worker, they generally look
exclusively to the collective bargaining agreement, with no consideration of public law. 77 Because arbitrators are therefore unlikely to

consider Title VII's prohibition against sexual harassment, they may
be more likely to make a finding of no just cause in the context of

sexual harassment than would a federal judge taking public law into
account. Moreover, while the union presents the alleged harasser's
side of the case,78 the alleged victim's interests are represented only
indirectly by the employer's attempts to justify the discipline imposed.
This personal representation versus the indirect representation of the
alleged victim's interests may provide an additional advantage for
alleged harassers in just cause settings.
On the whole, however, the procedural protections afforded
workers under a just cause system resemble those afforded employers
under Title VII in that both accused parties have an opportunity to
present their case in a neutral forum-an arbitration hearing in a just
cause system79 and a trial in federal court under Title VII.80 In both
settings, the party making the charge of sexual harassment carries
the burden of proving the allegation.81 In addition, the judgment of
76. But see Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 969
F.2d 1436, 1445 n.7 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that the definitive public policy against sexual
harassment would outweigh a procedural defect in the investigation; thus, discipline of the
alleged harasser would be necessary despite the existence of errors in the investigatory process).
77. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension
Between IndividualEmployment Rights and the New Deal Collective BargainingSystem, 59 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 575, 596 (1992) (noting the agreement of most commentators that when a collective
bargaining agreement makes no mention of external law, an arbitrator may not consider
external law in making her decision). But see Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1446
(affirn-ing the reversal of an arbitrator's reinstatement of a worker accused of sexual
harassment on the ground that reinstatement violated public policy as embodied in Title VII).
78. See Perritt, 1 Employee Dismissal § 3.9 at 217 (cited in note 55) (describing how the
union, as the exclusive representative of the worker, controls the grievance procedure on the
worker's behalf).
79. Although collective bargaining agreements typically provide for a hearing before an
arbitrator, government workers covered under the Civil Service Reform Act receive a hearing
before the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") after agency action against them is complete. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a) (Supp. 1994); Perritt, 2 Employee Dismissal § 6.4 at 7-8. For the sake
of simplicity, this Note refers to both arbitration hearings before arbitrators and hearings before
the MSPB as arbitration hearings and refers to hearing officers in both cases as arbitrators.
80. 42 U.S.C-.A § 2000e-5(f)(3).
81. A claimant alleging sexual harassment under Title VII must show by a preponderance
of the evidence that the harassment occurred. Susan M. Omilian, Sex-Based Employment
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the arbitrator in the just cause system and of the district court judge
or jury under Title VII carries great weight with regard to witness
credibility determinations.2 As these credibility judgments often
determine the outcome of the case, 83 the involvement of a neutral factfinder in making these decisions is critical to the perceived fairness of
the hearing.
The just cause standard also resembles Title VII procedural
protection in that it entitles the alleged harasser to an imposition of
penalties in accordance with the egregiousness of his offense,8 ' his
prior track record,85 and his potential for reform.86 If the offense is
Discrimination§ 22.01 (CBC, 1994). Either party may appeal the district court's finding to the
court of appeals, but the appellate court may not disturb such a factual finding unless the lower
court's judgment was "clearly erroneous." 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1292 (1988 & Supp. 1994); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 52(a) (1994); Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d 195, 198 (5th Cir. 1992).
Likewise, a government agency imposing discharge for sexual harassment must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the harassment occurred. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c) (Supp. 1994);
Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 768 F.2d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1985). If the worker appeals his
agency's determination, the MSPB will review it, ensuring that the agency based on substantial
evidence both its finding of guilt and its finding that removal will best promote the efficiency of
the service. Perritt, 2 Employee Dismissal § 6.4 at 8 (cited in note 55). Although either party
may appeal the MSPB's decision to federal court, the appellate court may not disturb the
MSPB's judgment unless it was not based on substantial evidence or was arbitrary and
capricious. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7703(c), 7513(a) (Supp. 1994); Snipes v. USPS, 677 F.2d 375, 376 (4th
Cir. 1982).
An employer subject to a collective bargaining agreement with a just cause provision must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that sexual harassment occurred in order for an allegation of
such misconduct to constitute just cause for dismissal. See Perritt, 1 Employee Dismissal § 3.5
at 208 (cited in note 55) (stating that the employer always carries the burden of proving wrongdoing in just cause dismissal cases). Although either party may appeal the arbitrator's decision
to federal court, the appellate court will not disturb the arbitrator's finding unless it falls within
one of the following narrow exceptions: (1) the dispute was not arbitrable; (2) the arbitrator did
not draw the essence of the decision from the collective bargaining agreement; (3) the decision
violates public policy; or (4) the decision involved fraud or corruption. Id. at § 3.24 at 243.
82. See note 81 (describing standards of review of MSPB decisions and arbitrations).
83. See, for example, Carosellav. USPS, 816 F.2d 638, 641-42 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (upholding
dismissal of alleged harasser on basis of presiding official's determination that alleged harasser's testimony was less credible than alleged victim's testimony); King Soopers, 86 Labor
Arb. (BNA) at 260-62 (removing suspension for sexual harassment after finding alleged
harasser's testimony more credible than alleged victim's testimony).
84. See, for example, SugardaleFoods Inc. and Local 17A, United Food and Commercial
Workers, 86 Labor Arb. (BNA) 1017, 1022 (1986) (Duna, Arbitrator) (holding that a reduction of
penalty from discharge to suspension was appropriate for an employee with a 25-year clean
record, who touched female co-worker inappropriately during a power failure).
85. See, for example, id.; Chrysler Motors v. Intl Union, Allied Industrial Workers of
America, 959 F.2d 685, 688-89 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding an arbitrator's reinstatement of an
employee who had engaged in sexual harassment when the employee had no record of prior
misconduct and was suitable for rehabilitation); Communications Workers of America v.
SoutheasternElectric Cooperative, 882 F.2d 467, 469 (10th Cir. 1989) (upholding an arbitrator's
reinstatement of an employee who had engaged in sexual harassment when the employee was
apologetic and possessed an otherwise clean work record).
86. See, for example, In re Hyatt Hotels PaloAlto and Hotel, Motel, RestaurantEmployees
and Bartenders Union, Local 19, 85 Labor Arb. (BNA) 11, 15-17 (1985) (Oestreich, Arbitrator)
(lessening penalty of discharge to 15-day suspension upon fimding that the employer failed to
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relatively minor and the track record good, the arbitrator may find
discharge to be too harsh and replace this penalty with a less severe
one, such as suspension without pay.8 7 Likewise, under Title VII, the

EEOC considers the prior track record of an employer and its willingness to reform when determining whether reasonable cause exists to
pursue a claim beyond the preliminary investigation stage. 88 Federal
judges also consider these factors when determining whether employers should incur liability under Title VII and, if so, to what extent. 89
The procedural protections afforded alleged harassers in union
and civil service employment settings thus closely resemble the procedural protections available to employers under Title VII and, in
turn, strike similar balances between competing interests. The accuser may enforce Title VII by complaining to her employer, filing a
complaint with the EEOC, and bringing suit against her co-worker
and potentially against her employer. These enforcement mechanisms, together with the availability of tort remedies if her suit is
successful, protect the interests of the accuser in eliminating discrimination in the workplace and obtaining compensation for injuries
incurred. At the same time, the alleged harasser may protect himself
from unjust penalties by giving his side of the story during the investigation and, if necessary, disputing the charges before a neutral arbitrator. Like Title VII in the context of accused employers, the just
cause system provides procedural protections for accused employees
to ensure that their interests are effectively balanced against the
interests of their accusers.

show that employee who had engaged in sexual harassment could not be rehabilitated); In re
IBP, Inc. and United Food and Commercial Workers Intl Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, Local 222, 89
Labor Arb. (BNA) 41, 45 (1987) (Eisler, Arbitrator) (upholding discharge for sexual harassment
on grounds that harasser's refusal to submit to psychological evaluation indicated that reform
was unlikely); In re United Electric Supply Co. and Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local 1, 82 Labor Arb. (BNA) 921, 926 (1984) (Madden, Arbitrator) (upholding discharge for
sexual harassment on grounds that harasser's poor performance record indicated that "further
corrective measures would be unavailing).
87. See notes 83-85.
88. For example, the EEOC may give considerable weight to an employer's showing of
steadily increasing minority and female hiring in its investigation of race and gender discrimination allegations. Katz, 28 Hastings L. J. at 907 (cited in note 26).
89. See note 43 and accompanying text. See also Katz, 28 Hastings L. J. at 906-07
(describing how an employer's supplying of statistics showing steadily increasing compliance
with Title VII may reduce or eliminate the employer's liability).
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B. Government Employment with ConstitutionalProtections
A termination from government employment necessarily involves state action. Unlike their at-will counterparts in the private
sector, government workers who fall outside the coverage of the Civil
Service Reform Act may therefore be entitled to some constitutional
procedural protection when they are discharged for sexual harassment.90 A discharge for sexual harassment most commonly implicates
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments,
although alleged harassers may also pursue other constitutional
claims, such as violations of the First Amendment or the Equal
Protection Clause, if the facts surounding their dismissal implicate
one of these provisions. 91 Because due process protections are more
directly analogous to procedural protections extended to employers
under Title VII and employees in just cause settings, this Part will
focus on due process protections to the exclusion of these other
potential constitutional protections.
In order to trigger a right to constitutional due process, a
worker must establish that he has been discharged, 92 that the discharge occurred under color of state law, 93 and that the discharge
90. Perritt, 2 Employee Dismissal § 6.2 at 51-57 (cited in note 55) (discussing the allowable
Section 1983 actions against state and local governments).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Government workers dismissed on charges of sexual harassment
may claim, for example, that their discharge implicates liberty interests protected by the
Constitution such as free speech and freedom of religion. Perritt, 2 Employee Dismissal § 7.21
at 95-98 (describing the constitutional rights of public employees). See, for example, Barnes v.
McDowell, 848 F.2d 725, 726 (6th Cir. 1988) (considering claims by two government workers
dismissed for sexual harassment that their dismissals actually occurred in retaliation for their
exercise of free speech); Clark v. Yosemite Community College Dist., 785 F.2d 781, 789-90 (9th
Cir. 1986) (holding that a teacher's lack of a vested right in a particular teaching assignment
does not bar his action for violation of his First Amendment rights); Silva v. University of New
Hampshire, 1994 WL 504417 at *23 (D. N.H.)(denying summary judgment to defendant state
university on the grounds that a professor discharged from his post for sexual harassment was
likely to prevail in his claim that this discharge violated his First Amendment rights).
A few government workers discharged for sexual harassment have also challenged their
dismissals under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with little success.
See, for example, Black, 857 F. Supp. at 1548 (holding that the alleged harasser failed to show
that his employer treated him differently than other workers also accused of sexual harassnient
and that this treatment resulted from constitutionally improper considerations).
92. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 706 (1976) (holding that, in the absence of an actual loss
of government employment, defamation of a government employee does not trigger due process
protections); Koelsch v. Town of Amesbury, 851 F. Supp. 497, 500-01 (D. Mass. 1994) (stating
that impairment of future employment opportunities and suspension with pay do not implicate
a constitutionally protected property interest). See also Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d 475, 481
(10th Cir. 1994) (holding a loss of future employment opportunity "too speculative" to implicate
a liberty interest when allegations of sexual harassment were resolved in favor of the employee
and the employee retained his job).
93. Parrattv. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniel v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).

1995]

HARASSERS' RIGHTS

1039

implicates either a property or a liberty interest. 94 Because a property
or liberty interest is implicated only upon discharge, government
workers are entitled to no due process protection when they incur
lesser penalties, such as demotion, for harassment and other misconduct.95 This limitation distinguishes constitutional due process protection from the procedural protections available to employers under
Title VII and to workers in just cause settings, which include the right
to a hearing in a neutral forum to challenge the imposition of any
penalty.
Whether a worker can establish a property interest in his job
depends on the structure of the state or federal law that creates the
job.9 If the law creates an expectation of entitlement to the job, the
worker has a property interest.97 An alleged harasser's success or
failure in establishing a property interest thus hinges on the terms of
his employment; the fact that he has been discharged for sexual harassment has no impact on the property interest analysis.
In order to establish a liberty interest, on the other hand, an
employee must show that a state actor made statements in connection
with his dismissal that damaged his reputation or foreclosed other
employment opportunities,9 8 that the statements were false,99 that the
statements foreclosed other employment opportunity, and that the
statements were published.O Because courts typically view sexual
harassment charges as marring one's reputation and marketability,
alleged harassers can usually establish damage of reputation and
foreclosure of employment opportunity. 101 Establishing falsehood may

94. Roth, 408 U.S. at 576-78.
95. See note 92 and accompanying text.
96. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577-78. A government employee may also establish a property
interest in his job by reference to an employment contract establishing a specific duration of
employment or providing specific criteria for dismissal. See Kirschling v. Lake Forest School
Dist., 687 F. Supp. 927, 933-34 (D. Del. 1988) (holding that an employment contract between a
school district and a prospective school principal providing for just cause dismissal created a
property interest).
97. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
98. Sullivan v. Stark, 808 F.2d 737, 739 (10th Cir. 1987).
99 Codd v. Velger, 429 F.2d 624, 627 (1977).
100. Workman, 32 F.3d at 481.
101. See, for example, Huff v. County of Butler, 524 F. Supp. 751, 753 (W.D. Pa. 1981)
(holding that a county employee's forced resignation amidst allegations of sexual harassment
implicated a liberty interest); Solomon v. Royal Oak Township, 656 F. Supp. 1254, 1264 (E.D.
Mich. 1986), aiTd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 842 F.2d 862 (1988) (holding that a police
officer's dismissal amidst allegations of sexual harassment implicated a liberty interest); Silva,
1994 WL 504417 at *24 (holding that a charge of sexual harassment implicated a liberty
interest).
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present greater difficulty, as the harasser must dispute the fact that
the alleged incident actually occurred, rather than disputing the
conclusion that a given incident amounted to sexual harassment.1°2 In
addition, most courts hold that the employer must affirmatively
inform the public of the damaging reason for the firing in order to
03
satisfy the publication requirement.

If an alleged harasser succeeds in establishing a property or
liberty interest, he is entitled to a hearing in which to refute the
charges against him. 1 4 Just as federal court hearings under Title VII
and arbitration hearings in just cause employment settings provide a
neutral forum in which to determine an alleged harasser's guilt or

102. Codd, 429 U.S. at 627.
103. See, for example, Derstein v. Kansas, 915 F.2d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding
that an alleged harasser's revelation of the reason for discharge to future employers did not
constitute publication: "'[to impinge on a liberty interest, the stigmatizing information must
be made public by the offending governmental entity" (quoting Rich v. Secretary of the Army,
735 F.2d 1220, 1227 (10th Cir. 1984)); Dubose v. Oustalet, 738 F. Supp. 188, 191 (S.D. Miss.
1990) (holding that "publication by someone other than the government employer does not
trigger [a liberty interest]'. For a different view, see Marwanga v. Human Resources Admin.
Dept. of Social Services, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12087 at *5-6 (S.D. N.Y.) (holding that
allegations of sexual harassment documented in an employee's personnel file should implicate a
liberty interest when the file is available to other employers); Bailey v. Kirk, 777 F.2d 567, 580
n.18 (10th Cir. 1985) (noting that the presence of false and defamatory information in an
employee's personnel file triggers a liberty interest if the fie is not restricted to internal use).
104. In most cases, an employee's interest in preserving his livelihood outweighs his
employer's interest in immediate termination, and so a pre-termination hearing is required.
Loudernill, 470 U.S. at 543-45. The pre-termination hearing need not consist of a full
evidentiary hearing, but instead need only provide the employee with "oral or written notice of
the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to
present his side of the story." Id. at 546. See also Schleck, 939 F.2d at 641-42 (holding that the
employer need not provide a full hearing or provide the alleged harasser with specific details of
the charges against him); Black, 857 F. Supp. at 1547-48 (holding that an alleged harasser need
not have an opportunity to discuss the charges against him during his employer's internal
investigation); Leftwich v. Bevilacqua, 635 F. Supp. 238, 241 (W.D. Va. 1986) (holding that the
employer's explanation of evidence need not be detailed or comprehensive). If the predeprivation hearing is defective, a full post-termination evidentiary hearing may suffice to cure
the defects. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546-47; Adams v. Sewell, 946 F.2d 757, 765 (11th Cir.
1991), overruled in part by McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994).
The court determines the scope of the hearing required in a particular situation by weighing
three factors: (1) the private interest to be affected be affected by state action; (2) the risk of
erroneous deprivation through the procedures used and the value of additional procedural
protections; and (3) the state's interest in keeping fiscal and administrative burdens to a minimum. Mathews v. Eldridge,424 U.S. 319,335 (1976).
Courts have not generally viewed allegations of sexual harassment as an emergency warranting an exception to the pre-termination hearing requirement. For examples of courts
holding that a discharge for sexual harassment warrants a pre-termination hearing, see
Kirschling,687 F. Supp. at 934; Lyons v. Barrett, 851 F.2d 406, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Moreover,
the preferred means of affording due process protection to an employee posing a significant
hazard to the workplace is suspension with pay pending the employee's pre-termination
hearing. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 544-45; Zavala v. Ariz. State PersonnelBd., 159 Ariz. 256, 766
P.2d 608, 615 (1987).
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innocence, due process assures employees a hearing free from bias.10 5
To ensure the employee a full opportunity to rebut the charges
against him, due process also entitles him to general notice of the
106
allegations and evidence supporting them.
However, due process hearings differ from Title VII and just
cause hearings in that a due process hearing need not be a full-blown
evidentiary hearing on the merits of the case. 0 7 Instead, the worker
need only receive an opportunity to tell his side of the story. 0 8 Once
he has received some opportunity to be heard, the worker has no
further right to challenge the judgment of his employer in determining guilt and imposing the penalty of discharge. 0 9
If a worker shows that he has been deprived of a property
interest without an opportunity to be heard, he may receive compensatory and punitive damages from his employer.110 The court may
also direct the employer to reinstate the worker."' On the other
hand, if the worker shows that he has been deprived of a liberty interest, he may receive compensatory and punitive damages, but is
generally not entitled to reinstatement." 2 Thus, a court's finding that
a government worker was deprived of a liberty interest nonetheless
allows for imposition of a severe penalty--discharge-even in cases
where the worker was, in fact, innocent of the charges against him.
Significantly, a government worker asserting a liberty interest
receives no due process protection unless he establishes that the

105. Levitt v. Univ. of Texas at El Paso, 759 F.2d 1224, 1228 (5th Cir. 1985). The Levitt
court specifically noted that due process entitles an employee to "a hearing before a tribunal

that possesses some academic expertise and an apparent impartiality toward the charges." Id.
at 1227-28. See also McDaniels v. Flick, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6600 at *12 (E.D. Pa.) (holding
that an apparent aim of catching an alleged harasser "off guard" deprived him of a meaningful

hearing).
106. Levitt, 759 F.2d at 1228. See also Adams, 946 F.2d at 765-66 (holding that an
employer's refusal to allow an alleged harasser access to lab records forming the basis of his
alibi deprived him of an adequate pre-termination hearing).
107. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545.
108. Id. at 546.
109. The Court noted that additional procedural protections "would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government's interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee."
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
111. See, for example, Derstein v. Benson, 747 F. Supp. 1414, 1415 (D. Kan. 1989) (holding
that employee's rebuttal of sexual harassment charges entitles him to reinstatement); Jackson
v. City of Albuquerque, 890 F.2d 225, 231-32 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that employee's rebutting
of sexual harassment charges entitles him to lost wages and reinstatement, despite possible

workplace hostility).
112. Lyons, 851 F.2d at 411.
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allegations triggering his discharge were false."3 Thus, an alleged
harasser who admits to the facts charged, but claims he misunderstood their significance as sexual harassment establishes no due
process claim." 4 Likewise, a worker with a good prior record and a
willingness to reform his behavior and attitude asserts no due process
claim so long as he admits that the factual scenario underlying his
discharge occurred." 5 Due process protection of a liberty interest thus
differs significantly from just cause protection in its lack of concern
16
for the progressive discipline and rehabilitation of the worker."
Due process thus plays a more limited role in providing procedural protections for government workers accused of sexual harassment. Because alleged harassers who cannot establish a property or
liberty interest have no due process rights, their interests remain
unprotected. In addition, due process hearings do not allow an alleged harasser to dispute the characterization of a certain factual
pattern as sexual harassment, nor do they mandate consideration of
an alleged harasser's prior track record or potential for reform before
imposing a penalty. Nonetheless, because it entitles alleged harassers to a neutral forum in which to dispute the allegations against
them, due process provides some balance between the interests of
accusers in enforcing Title VII and the interests of alleged harassers
in protecting themselves from unjust penalties.
Government workers who fall outside the protection of the
Civil Service Reform Act are thus entitled to a hearing free from bias
to tell their side of the story, so long as they can show a property or
liberty interest in their jobs. Although this procedural protection falls
short of that available to workers in a just cause setting, it
nonetheless provides government workers minimum protection to
ensure, in many cases, some opportunity to be heard. Their at-will
counterparts in the private sector, however, receive none of this
113. See notes 99 and 102 and accompanying text.
114. See Codd, 429 U.S. at 628 (holding that a parolee's characterization of an attempted
suicide as "horseplay" did not constitute a challenge to the truth of the allegation and thus
implicated no liberty interest).
115. See id. (holding that a challenge to the penalty imposed for a given set of facts does not
constitute a challenge to the truth of the allegations and thus implicates no liberty interest).
116. Because the scope of due process protection when a property interest is involved varies
with both the terms of the law or contract creating the property interest and the factors defined
in Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, due process protection of a property interest also may fail to

ensure that the penalty a worker receives is appropriate in light of prior track record and
willingness to reform. See notes 65 to 96, 103 and accompanying texts. See also Loudernill,
470 U.S. at 545-46 (noting that the state law creating the property interest at issue required a

full evidentiary hearing after termination, but that due process required lesser protection prior
to termination-namely, notice of charges, explanation of employer's proof, and opportunity for
worker to tell his side of the story).
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With no statutory or constitutional
constitutional protection.
provisions protecting their interests in a fair hearing against the
interests of employers in firing workers accused of sexual harassment
to insulate themselves from liability, the at-will worker in the private
sector must rely on traditional tort claims and limited common law
exceptions to the at-will doctrine. Part IV describes these claims and
evaluates their effectiveness in addressing the interests of at-will
workers charged with sexual harassment.
IV. EMPLOYMENT AT WILL: THE VIRTUAL ABSENCE OF PROCEDURAL
PROTECTIONS FOR WORKERS ACCUSED OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Under traditional employment-at-will doctrine, an employer
may fire an employee for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at
all. 117 Thus, an alleged harasser typically has no right to notice of the
charges against him and no opportunity to refute these charges prior
or subsequent to dismissal. An alleged harasser may nonetheless
obtain judicial review on the merits of his discharge if the discharge
implicates a tort claim or if he falls within one of the exceptions his
jurisdiction has recognized to at-will employment: implied contract,
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, or public policy.118 This
Part considers the impact of each of these options on the procedural
rights of alleged harassers to determine whether any protective
mechanism exists to accommodate the interests of an at-will worker
accused of harassment in obtaining a fair hearing and appropriate
penalty.
Under traditional employment-at-will doctrine, a discharged
employee has recourse to judicial review only if his dismissal implicates a tort claim, such as defamation or infliction of emotional distress. 19 The efficacy of these tort actions in providing procedural
117. Perritt, 1 Employee Dismissal § 1.1 at 3 (cited in note 55); Note, 96 Harv. L. Rev. at
1931 (cited in note 67).
118. See notes 132-53 and accompanying text. For a summary of the exceptions to the atwill doctrine recognized by each state, see Perritt, 1 Employee Dismissal§§ 1.13-1.63 at 26-66.
119. See, for example, Lawson v. Boeing Co., 58 Wash. App. 261, 792 P.2d 545, 549-51
(1990) (considering an alleged harasser's claims for defamation, tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage, and outrage in the context of employment at will); Nijgar v.
PeterbiltMotors Co., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 619 at *12, 15-16 (N.D. Cal. 1993), aft'd, 42 F.3d
1401 (1994) (considering an alleged harasser's claims for defamation and negligent infliction of
emotional distress in an employment-at-will setting); Sloan v. Boeing Co., 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4795 at *43-53 (D. Kan. 1994) (considering claims of intentional infliction of emotional
distress and defamation in an employment-at-will setting).
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protection to alleged harassers is limited by the nature of the claims
themselves. Defamation, for instance, typically requires publication
of libelous matter. 120 Like a government worker making a due process
claim, an at-will worker claiming defamation must deny the truth of
the facts alleged in the defamatory statement. 12 If an alleged harasser admits that the facts in the statement occurred, but denies the
conclusion that these facts amount to sexual harassment, he will fail
122
in his claim for defamation and thus be denied relief.
Most courts also grant employers a conditional privilege that
protects them from defamation claims arising from in-house investigations of sexual harassment. 123 An alleged harasser may overcome
this privilege if he can show malice, bad faith, or abuse on the part of
the employer, 124 but very few alleged harassers successfully clear
these hurdles. 25 Likewise, alleged harassers rarely succeed in claims
of infliction of emotional distress. 26 I'ypically, the court finds that an
employer's investigation or firing of an alleged harasser falls short of
the "extreme and outrageous" conduct required for intentional and
127
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Nonetheless, those few alleged harassers who succeed in making out a tort claim may receive a hearing on the sexual harassment
charge itsef

28

and on the employer's treatment of the charge.

29

120. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977); Ekokotu v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 205 Ga. App.
534,422 S.E.2d 903, 904 (1992). Thus, the truth of an allegedly libelous statement constitutes a
complete defense to defamation. Int7 Minerals & Chem., 42 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 45,361
(May 27, 1986).
121. Lambert v. Morehouse, 68 Wash. App. 500, 843 P.2d 1116, 1120 (1993).
122. Id.
123. See Lambert, 843 P.2d at 1120. See also Garziano v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
818 F.2d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 1987) (discussing the jurisprudential basis of the privilege).
124. Garziano, 818 F.2d at 386.
125. For examples of cases dismissing alleged harassers' defamation claims upon a finding
that the employer did not abuse its qualified privilege, see Lambert, 843 P.2d at 1120; Garziano,
818 F.2d at 389-91; Ekokotu, 422 S.E.2d at 904; Manning v. Cigna Corp., 807 F. Supp. 889, 89899 (D. Conn. 1991).
126. See, for example, Agugliaro v. Brooks Brothers, 802 F. Supp. 956, 964 (S.D. N.Y. 1992)
(finding that the plaintiffs allegations were not sufficiently outrageous); Sloan, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4795 at *45-46 (noting that the overwhelming majority of Kansas cases have rejected
such claims); Nifiar, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 619 at *15 (stating that plaintiff failed to support his
claim).
127. Agugliaro, 802 F. Supp. at 964; Int' Minerals, 42 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 45,363.
For a survey of other traditional tort claims available to alleged harassers, see Perritt, 1
Employee Dismissal §§ 5.41-5.48 at 537-75 (cited in note 55).
128. In a trial for defamation, the factfinder must determine whether the allegations of
harassment are true. See note 122 and accompanying text.
129. In a claim for defamation, for instance, the factfnder must determine whether the
employer abused its privilege and behaved negligently in publicizing the charges against the
alleged harasser. See Perritt, 1 Employee Dismissal § 5.44 at 552-59 (cited in note 55).
Likewise, in a claim for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, the factfnder
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Unlike workers in a just cause system, at-will workers carry the burden of proof in establishing that harassment did not occur, when such
proof is required. 10 Moreover, this showing alone triggers no relief for
the at-will worker. He must also show that the employer's behavior
constituted a tort. 13' Because tort law protects only alleged harassers
who can prove their employer's guilt, apart from their own innocence,
traditional tort claims are ill-suited for protecting the interests of
alleged harassers.
Although some courts have recognized limited exceptions to
the employment-at-will doctrine, these exceptions provide little assurance that an alleged harasser will receive a fair hearing or an
appropriate penalty. For instance, a majority of courts recognize an
exception to the at-will doctrine when the worker demonstrates the
existence of an implied employment contract. 3 2 A worker may establish the existence of such a contract through reference to a personnel
manual or grievance procedure setting forth disciplinary procedures
or limitations on discharge. 3 3 However, a court may find these procedures insufficient to alter the at-will presumption if the worker was
not aware of them and thus did not rely on them.'3 In addition,
must determine whether the employer's treatment of the allegations was sufficiently outrageous
to trigger liability. Id. at § 5.42 at 543-48.
130. See, for example, Sloan, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4795 at *51 (stating that in order to
bring a defamation action, plaintiff must prove that defendant's statement was false and
defamatory).
131. Even if an alleged harasser establishes his innocence, he will receive no tort relief unless he also shows that the employer defamed him or inflicted severe and unwarranted emotional distress upon him or engaged in some other tortious behavior. See 1 Perritt, Employee
Dismissal § 5.40 at 533-37 (cited in note 55) (noting that a worker bringing a tort claim against
his employer carries the burden of showing a specific intent to harm on the part of the
employer).
132. As of 1987, more than half the states had recognized a finding of an implied contract
as a means of rebutting the at-will presumption. Leonard, 66 N.C. L. Rev. at 635-36 (cited in
note 17).
133. See, for example, Saini v. Cleveland PneumaticCo., No. 51913, slip. op. (Ohio Ct. App.,
May 14, 1987) (holding that a sexual harassment policy contained an implied promise that
discharge would be imposed only after an appropriate investigation); Starishevsky v. Hofstra
Univ., 612 N.Y.S.2d 794, 803 (1994) (holding that Title IX's requirement of a grievance
procedure for sexual harassment allegations in school settings, combined with the specific
provisions of the defendant employer's procedure, restricted the employer's right of discharge in
harassment cases to individuals who are "actually found guilty" under such procedures);
Kestenbaum v. Penzoil Co., 108 N.M. 20, 766 P.2d 280, 285 (1988) (holding that employer's
representations to alleged harasser that he could only be fired for "'a good reason, a just
cause,"' taken together with other facts, established a just cause limitation on firing); Baxter v.
Greeley Gas Co., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8725 *1, 6-7 (D. Kan.) (holding that personnel manual
established program of progressive discipline and created an issue of fact for jury as to whether
manual created an implied employment contract).
134. For an argument in support of this requirement, see Winters, 1985 Duke L. J. at 213
(cited in note 17). The reliance requirement for creation of an implied contract links this
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courts will often refuse to enforce such procedures if the manual or
policy specifically provides that the procedures do not alter the employment-at-will relationship. 13 5
Implied contracts thus constitute an unreliable means of affording alleged harassers procedural protections similar to those
provided employers under Title VII.136 If the alleged harasser successfully' establishes the existence of such a contract, the contract will
entitle him only to varying degrees of protection according to its particular terms. 13 7 Moreover, employers can easily evade the limitations
imposed by such contracts by including disclaimers in all policies and
manuals distributed to employees.38 The implied contract exception
thus fails to provide alleged harassers with reliable procedures to
balance their interests against those of their accusers.
A few states imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing
into all employment relationships.139 Because such a covenant arises
from contract law, some courts disallow tort remedies, such as damages for pain and suffering. 40 Likewise, courts vary in the extent to
which they impose obligations not already explicit in the employment
analysis closely to promissory estoppel; indeed, several courts have applied promissory estoppel
theory in addition to implied contract analysis. See, for example, Young, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS
141 at *24-25 (denying plaintiff relief under a promissory estoppel theory).
135. See, for example, Talanda v. KFC NatY Mgmt. Co., 863 F. Supp. 664, 666-70 (N.D. Ill.
1994) (holding that an employer's handbook did not create an implied contract when it specifically disclaimed an interpretation altering the at-will relationship); Saini, No. 51913, slip. op.
(holding that, in light of disclaimer specifically stating that handbook provisions do not
constitute contractual terms, employee had no right to rely on the provisions as an implied
contract). See also Galietiv. State FarmMutual Auto. Ins. Co., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11858 *1,
5 (D. Colo.) (discussing and then rejecting the principle that, despite a specific disclaimer, an
employer may be contractually bound by mandatory termination procedures or requirements for
just cause termination set forth in a personnel manual).
136. For a similar view of implied contracts, see Leonard, 66 N.C. L. Rev. at 653 (cited in
note 17) (noting the fragile nature of the implied contract).
137. If a personnel manual provided for just cause termination, for example, the alleged
harasser would receive extensive protections similar to those discussed in Part IIlA above. On
the other hand, if the manual provided only for an investigation into charges of misconduct prior
to firing, the alleged harasser would receive lesser protections similar to those afforded alleged
harassers in states recognizing a tort similar to negligent investigation as discussed in notes
150 to 153 and accompanying text.
138. See note 135 and accompanying text.
139. See, for example, Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549, 551-52
(1974) (holding that an employer breached an employment-at-will contract by acting in bad
faith); Noye v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 238 N.J. Super. 430, 570 A.2d 12, 13 (1990) (stating that
all contracts contain an implied contract of good faith and fair dealing); Fortune v. The National
Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256-57 (1977) (noting the general contractual requirement of good faith). Montana imposes such an implied covenant by means of a
statute. Mont. Code. Ann. § 39-2-503 (1987). For a description of the judicial innovations in
Montana's common law that led the state legislature to adopt this statute, see Leonard, 66 N.C.
L. Rev. at 663-71 (cited in note 17).
140. Noye, 570 A.2d at 15.
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relationship on the basis of this covenant. 141 The "good faith" standard also involves a subjective judgment on the part of the factfinder
concerning the employer's motivation in pursuing a particular course
of conduct, resulting in uncertainty of application and result142
Nonetheless, a court's imposition of a covenant of good faith
and fair dealing on at-will employment relationships will provide a
minimal degree of protection for alleged harassers143 Employers
must, at a minimum, show that they reasonably believed that the
accused worker had committed sexual harassment.'" An implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing thus increases the degree of
employer neutrality when investigating claims of sexual harassment.
Nonetheless, the degree of subjectivity and variance in application of
this standard from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, together with the small
number of jurisdictions recognizing a covenant of good faith, renders
this exception to employment at will an unreliable means of protecting the interests of alleged harassers.
In contrast to the small number of courts implying a covenant
of good faith and fair dealing into the employment relationship, a
majority of courts currently recognize a public policy exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine.145 Courts typically use this exception,
however, to enforce dismissals of alleged harassers instead of ensuring that alleged harassers receive procedural protections.146

When

141. Compare Fortune, 364 N.E.2d at 1257 (stating that the implied covenant of good faith
merely assures that neither party will do anything to prevent the other party from receiving the
"fruits of the contract," quoting Uproar Co. v. National BroadcastingCo., 81 F.2d 373, 377 (1st
Cir. 1936)), with Monge, 316 A.2d at 551-52 (using a balancing test to determine that an
employer must act in good faith to avoid breaching an employment contract).
142. Leonard, 66 N.C. L. Rev. at 655 (cited in note 17).
143. See id. at 656 (noting that courts have not used the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing to reinstate an unwanted employee, but rather to ensure a certain degree of fairness in
termination decisions).
144. Noye, 570 A.2d at 13. Thus, even if a jury finds that allegations of harassment are
false, an employer's decision to terminate the alleged harasser does not violate the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing so long as the employer reasonably believed the alleged
harasser to be guilty. Id.
145. More than 30 states currently recognize this exception. Leonard, 66 N.C. L. Rev. at
635 (cited in note 17). Courts vary in the degree to which they allow themselves discretion to
define public policy in the absence of a specific statutory mandate. See, for example, Simpson v.
Pizza Hut, Inc., 58 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 558, 562 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that the court was not
allowed any discretion).
146. See, for example, Williams v. Maremont Corp., 875 F.2d 1476, 1485 (10th Cir. 1989)
(holding that "public policy operates to require a construction of contract terms in favor of giving
the employer broad discretion in its efforts to eliminate sexual harassment from the workplace"); Simpson, 58 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) at 563 (holding that an employee's discharge on
allegations of sexual harassment "can hardly be said to violate a 'clear mandate of public
policy"); Willis v. Ideal Basic Industries, Inc., 484 S.2d 444, 446 (Ala. 1986) (stating that
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courts reference Title VII as a statutory mandate evidencing a specific
public policy against sexual harassment, they view alleged victims as
147
the statute's exclusive concern.
Nonetheless, at least one court has recognized that Title VII's
policy against sexual harassment requires a balancing of the interests
of alleged victims and alleged harassers. In Ashway v. Ferrellgas,
Inc., 148 the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona held that
Title VI's public policy against sexual harassment imposes on employers a duty toward both alleged victims and alleged harassers to
investigate charges in a non-negligent manner. 49 The court thus
extended the tort of negligent supervision1 ° to encompass claims that
an employer had negligently investigated charges of harassment. 5'
This holding ensured that a worker charged with sexual harassment
would receive a reasonable investigation of the claim against him
152
before losing his job.

Like the tort claims discussed above, a claim for negligent
supervision provides some protection for alleged harassers, but falls
short of the protection afforded employees under just cause systems
and employers under Title VII. Again, the alleged harasser recovers
only if he shows tortious behavior on the part of his employer. While
he may challenge his employer's methods of investigation, he may not
challenge the conclusions his employer draws from it.'53 In addition,
charges of sexual harassment would remove an employee from even a broad public policy
concern of wrongful discharge).
147. See, for example, Willis, 484 S.2d at 446 (holding that an alleged harasser's petition of
the court to adopt a tort of wrongful discharge was misplaced because one dismissed for sexual
harassment would have no claim under such a tort).
148. 59 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 375 (Dec. 6, 1989).
149. Id. at 377 (stating- "It seems somewhat absurd that the public policy against sexual
harassment in the work place, requiring an employer to investigate charges of sexual harassment, creates an obligation to protect a complainant, but does not protect an innocent person
who has been accused").
150. Restatement (Second) ofAgency § 213 (1958).
151. Id. Montana courts also have recognized a tort of negligent investigation, effectively
creating a cause of action for wrongful discharge. Flaniganv. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 221 Mont. 419, 720 P.2d 257, 263 (1986). Montana's recognition of this tort is consistent
with its statutory recognition of an implicit covenant of good faith and fair dealing in all employment contracts. See Leonard, 66 N.C. L. Rev. at 667-70 (cited in note 17) (describing the
role of the Flanigan decision in prompting the Montana legislature to codify an action for
wrongful termination). Most other jurisdictions, however, have declined to follow Montana's
lead and have refused to recognize a tort of negligent investigation. See, for example, Lambert,
843 P.2d at 1119-20; Wiggins, No. 85-2200-S, slip. op. at 1.
152. Ashway, 59 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) at 377.
153. Id. at 378. The Ashway court noted that this limitation on the tort of negligent investigation preserves the employer's freedom to operate its business in an efficient and profitable
manner. Id. at 378 n.10. Recognizing a tort claim of negligent investigation thus gives at-wil
employees similar protection to that afforded government employees under the Due Process
Clause. While due process guarantees government workers an opportunity to be heard, it does
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the tort provides no

means

for employees

to

challenge

the

appropriateness of discharge in light of prior track record and
potential for reform. The claim thus fails to ensure alleged harassers
a hearing in a neutral forum and an imposition, if necessary, of a fair
penalty.
Nonetheless, a conception of public policy that requires employers to investigate charges of harassment in a non-negligent manner ensures minimal procedural protection to all alleged harassers in
at-will settings. If alleged harassers cannot challenge the conclusions
their employers draw, they can at least challenge the investigatory
methodology by which the employers arrived at those conclusions. To
date, only one federal district court has interpreted the public policy
exception to require a non-negligent investigation of harassment
claims. The Ashway court's view of the public policy exception does,
however, provide a starting point for achieving some balance between
the interests of alleged harassers and their accusers.
Alleged harassers in at-will employment settings thus possess
virtually no procedural protections akin to those afforded employers
under Title VII. Traditional tort claims generally do not address the
concerns of alleged harassers regarding a fair determination of guilt
and imposition of penalty and are thus ill-suited to improving the
balance between alleged harassers and their accusers. The implied
contract and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exceptions to the at-will rule also provide little protection for harassers
because of the varying degrees of protection that they provide and, in
the case of implied contracts, the ease with which employers may
avoid them.
Courts usually construe Title VII's public policy against sexual
harassment as protecting only alleged victims. The public policy
exception thus typically affords no additional rights to alleged harassers, but instead encourages dismissal of alleged harassers without
regard to how well guilt has been established, the egregiousness of
the offense, and the alleged harasser's prior track record and potential for reform. The public policy exception thus fails to reflect Title
VII's model of balancing the interests of accused and accuser.
This lack of procedural protection increases the possibility that
workers who are innocent of the charges against them will unjustly
suffer the severe penalty of discharge. In addition, workers who are
not necessarily guarantee a full hearing on the facts of the case or the conclusion the employer
draws from these facts. See notes 104, 107 to 109 and accompanying text.
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guilty of sexual harassment but who regret their actions have no opportunity to reform their behavior and attitudes on the job. These
results should trouble policymakers, because they undermine Title
VII's goal of eliminating sexual harassment in the workplace on two
levels: behavioral reform on the part of individual workers and attitudinal reform on the part of society at large.
On an individual level, allegations of sexual harassment typically give rise to enormous repercussions in the alleged harasser's
professional and personal life. An arbitrator considering charges of
sexual harassment against a worker in a just cause setting described
the significance of the allegations by noting: "[It is not overly dramatic to say.., that the Grievant's very life is on the line. All that he
is: his marriage; his relationship with his children; his karate school;
his standing in the community; his relationships with other employees-all of this is on the line."1M With such high stakes involved, a
dismissal based on unjust allegations with no investigation or opportunity for the alleged harasser to present his side of the story may
lead the alleged harasser to develop more negative views of women in
the workplace and insensitivity to the harm caused by real instances
of sexual harassment.
In Williams v. Maremont Corp., 55 a worker, Williams, was
fired from his job as general foreman at a plant due to allegations that
he had pulled down the zipper of his pants in front of male and female
workers while on the job.56 Williams admitted that he had "reached
down" toward his crotch area, but claimed that the incident did not
amount to sexual harassment because it occurred while he was joking
with a female employee that he used to date, and who had joked that
he was too old "to get it up."r, Williams nonetheless admitted that
the act was wrong and that discipline was appropriate, but claimed
that discharge was too harsh a penalty 58
Finding that Williams did not fall within one of the exceptions
to the at-will rule, the appellate court overturned a jury award of
$750,000 in actual damages and $250,000 in punitive damages, and
upheld the legitimacy of his dismissal. 59 The court noted that the
jury clearly thought discharge to be too harsh a penalty, and re154. In re King Soopers, Inc., 86 Labor Arb. (BNA) 254. Although the worker in this case
was employed full time by King Soopers, Inc., he ran his own karate school on the side. Id. at
257.
155. Williams, 875 F.2d 1476.
156. Id. at 1477.
157. Id. at 1477-78.
158. Id. at 1478.
159. Id. at 1478, 1484-86.
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marked that a lesser penalty may have been more appropriate.
Because of Williams' status as an at-will employee, however, the court
held that it lacked the power to question the penalty imposed; as an
at-will employer, Maremount was free to exact whatever sanction it
160
deemed appropriate.
The disparity between the jury verdict and the court's stated
opinion of the case on the one hand and the case's outcome on the
other suggests that the severe penalty of discharge in the case of a
first-time offender who admits fault conflicts with general notions of
fair play. Moreover, because workers like Williams who sexually
harass a co-worker receive the same discipline regardless of whether
they regret their behavior or refuse to acknowledge their mistake, the
at-will system provides little incentive for them to admit their harassing behavior and work to alter it.
The penalty of discharge for first-time harassers seems especially harsh considering how dramatically the standard of behavior
imposed by Title VII differs from pre-existing workplace norms and
thus takes many alleged harassers by surprise. For example, in
Young v. HobartBrothers Co.,161 an employer discharged a twelve-year
veteran worker, Young, on charges of sexual harassment after a female worker under his supervision was taped to a pole on the shop
floor. 16 2 Although viewed objectively this incident would seem to
violate directly Title VII's prohibition of sexual harassment in the
workplace, the female employee herself did not agree with this assessment. 6 3 Claiming that the incident was a joke perpetrated by her
co-workers who did not wish to see her leave, the female employee
164
denied that she had been sexually harassed.

160. Id. at 1486. The court noted:
It is clear by the size of the award, and punitive damages, that the jury in this case
thought that Maremont acted too severely by terminating Williams for what it must
have regarded as a comparatively small event after twelve years of blemish-free service.
Unquestionably, Maremont could have disciplined Williams in ways short of discharge,
and in doing so made it clear to all concerned that his conduct was absolutely unacceptable, and any other improper speech or conduct would result in immediate discharge. In
retrospect, that, perhaps, would have been wisest. But the question is not whether
Maremont was miduly harsh in this instance, the question is whether it had the legal
right to terminate Williams under the circumstances. We conclude that it did.
Id.
161.
162.
163.
164.

1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 141.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
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Despite this confusion as to whether the incident amounted to
joking or sexual harassment under Title VII,165 the employer fired
Young. 166 Because of his status as an at-will employee who did not
fall within any of the exceptions recognized in his jurisdiction, Young
was powerless to challenge his discharge. 67 Young's case illustrates
the dilemma of both male and female at-will workers who must
comply fully with Title VIi's new behavioral norms before they have
developed a full understanding of what these norms are. In order for
Title VII to respect the interests of workers to the same extent it
respects the interests of feminists and employers, it must make
allowances for the learning process that necessarily precedes workers'
ability to comply fully with the Act.
Six major newspapers recently carried a New York Times article describing the trend amongst at-will employees unjustly dismissed
on charges of sexual harassment to bring suit against their accusers
and their employers for the purpose of clearing their names. 68 In
addition, several dramatic cases of alleged harassers committing
suicide out of despair over what they perceived to be unfair charges
against them have raised the public's concern about the type of procedural protection available to at-will employees accused of sexual
harassment. 69 As these cases grow in number and receive increasing
165. Because EEOC guidelines require that conduct be "unwelcome" by the alleged victim
in order for it to constitute sexual harassment, the behavior at issue in this case probably would
not amount to sexual harassment under Title VII. EEOC, Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a). See also Kelly Ann Cahill, Note, Hooters: Should There
Be an Assumption of Risk Defense to Some Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment
Claims?, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1107, 1122-25 (1995) (distinguishing assumption of risk from
unwelcomeness).
166. Young, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 141 at *5. Although the employer claimed that Young
had resigned by mutual agreement, Young maintained that he had been wrongfully discharged.
Id.
167. Id. at *8-26. Despite the company's failure to adhere to the four-step progressive
disciplinary procedure contained in its policy manual, the court held that Young had no right to
challenge his discharge because the manual contained a disclaimer and thus did not amount to
an implied contract altering the at-will relationship. Id. at *3-4, 12-14.
168. Murray, N.Y. Times at 3-23 (cited in note 20). The same article also appeared under
different titles in the following newspapers: Suit-Countersuit: Men Accused of Sexual
HarassmentAre FightingBack-And Winning, Chicago Tribune, Womanews Sect. at 4 (Oct. 2,
1994); Men Fight Harassment Charges: Suits Contend Accused is a Victim, The Houston
Chronicle, Business Sect. at 5 (Sept. 18, 1994); Sexual Harassment CasesReveal Another Side of
the Issue, The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, Q-10 (Sept. 18, 1994); HarassmentSuits: Men
Fight Back, International Herald Tribune (Sept. 17, 1994); The Other Side of Sexual
Harassment,The Tennessean 5E (Sept. 18, 1994).
169. See, for example, Libby Lewi, Suit Blames Son's Suicide on AT&T, News & Record
(Greensboro, NC) Al (July 24, 1994) (describing the lawsuit brought by a suicide victim's family
charging that his employer's aggressive handling of a sexual harassment complaint caused his
death, noting- "Less and less, the legal question isn't whether companies are dealing with
complaints of sexual harassment. More and more, the question is how'); Teacher's Suicide
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publicity, 170 public attention could well shift from the problem of sexual harassment to the injustice of alleged harassers receiving severe
penalties without fair hearings. To ensure continuing public support
for the elimination of sexual harassment in the workplace, Congress
should temper the incentives for employers to insulate themselves
from liability by immediately firing alleged harassers with mandatory
procedural protections for workers accused of harassment.
The alternative view of public policy as mandating fair treatment of both alleged victims and alleged harassers provides for at
least minimal protection of alleged harassers in the at-will setting.
This view ensures that all alleged harassers will receive some hearing
in the context of a fair investigation. The non-negligent investigation
requirement parallels Title VII's emphasis on a neutral forum in
which to determine the legitimacy of claims against employers and
thus provides a starting point for achieving a balance of competing
interests. Part V considers this possibility for increasing procedural
protections available to at-will workers accused of harassment and
others.

Draws Sexual Harassment Concerns, National Public Radio, Morning Edition (June 15, 1993)
(noting that a high school teacher's suicide over charges of sexual harassment "has raised some
difficult questions about sexual harassment in schools and the ability of school officials to
balance their concerns for students who are victimized with the rights of teachers who are
accused"). For an example of a similar incident in Western Europe, see Sports Chief Clears
Name of Journalist,The Herald (Glasgow) 6 (April 18, 1994) (reporting that the British Athletic
Federation cleared the name of a well-known journalist and coach in its employ of sexual
harassment charges after he committed suicide over the allegations).
170. For examples of additional newspaper articles discussing the injustice of discharging
at-will employees without a hearing, see L.G., Cleared of Sex HarassmentCharge, Yet Scarred
for Life, Orlando Sentinel Tribune G-3 (Oct. 27, 1991) (describing the author's own experience as
an alleged harasser and declaring. "... Americans must demand confidential investigations and
guarantees that the benefit of the doubt goes to the accused"); Pat Dunnigan, Newspaper Settles
Fight With FormerPublisher,Miami Daily Business Review, 1-1 (Sept. 28, 1993) (reporting that
a newspaper agreed to pay a former publisher $40,000 to settle a defamation suit brought by the
publisher, who was fired amidst allegations of sexual harassment without an investigation into
the charges).
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to accommodate the interests of at-will workers
charged with sexual harassment and thereby promote the effectiveness and fairness of Title VII, Congress should consider amending
Title VII in one of two ways. At a minimum, Congress should direct
the EEOC to amend its guidelines to state that simply firing the alleged harasser, without more, will not insulate employers from liability for sexual harassment occurring between fellow employees. 171 The
EEOC should then set forth examples of "appropriate" penalties that
would suffice to insulate employers from liability in this area, such as
mandatory counseling, formal reprimands, and suspension. This rule
would provide incentive for employers to invest resources in developing penalties for sexual harassment that both encouraged on-the-job
reform by alleged harassers and recognized the complex process
involved as workers learn to adapt their behavior to new standards.
The guidelines should also set forth instances in which firing
the alleged harasser would constitute an "appropriate" penalty, and
would thus suffice to insulate the employer from liability. Such instances could include cases in which an alleged harasser had been
disciplined for other incidents of sexual harassment in the past.
Likewise, discharge could constitute an appropriate penalty when the
employer had conducted a reasonable investigation to determine the
guilt of the alleged harasser, but the alleged harasser refused to acknowledge his mistake. Because the alleged harasser in each of these
instances would have received an opportunity to conform his behavior
to Title VII's standards but nonetheless exhibited an unwillingness or
inability to do so, discharge would constitute an appropriate penalty.
Second, Congress should amend Title VII to require employers
to develop and publish grievance procedures for the prompt and fair
resolution of sexual harassment complaints and to abide by these
procedures in resolving all claims of sexual harassment172 Congress
could state this requirement in general terms or instead choose to
mandate particular steps that every grievance procedure must include
to be considered "fair." Such mandatory steps might include a rea-

171. The guidelines currently state: "With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an
employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or
its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can
show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d).
172. The federal regulations implementing Title IX currently require educational institutions to implement and abide by such policies. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b)(1994).
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sonable investigation into the charges and an opportunity for both
alleged victims and alleged harassers to tell their sides of the story.
Congress should also consider requiring that these grievance
procedures place the burden of proof on alleged victims of harassment
so that alleged harassers would not incur a penalty unless there was
reasonable cause to believe the charges were true. Placing the burden of proof on alleged victims would accommodate the interests of
alleged harassers in incurring a penalty only after guilt has been
determined. The requirement would thus extend procedural protection to at-will workers accused of harassment similar to that currently afforded employers under Title VII and workers in just cause
settings.
If Congress fails to adopt the above proposals or comparable
solutions, the courts could improve the procedural protections available to alleged harassers in at-will settings by following the lead of
the Arizona district court in Ashway v. Ferrellgas.173 By broadening
the public policy exception to at-will employment to require employers
to conduct a non-negligent investigation of sexual harassment charges
before imposing a penalty, the courts would provide a minimal level of
procedural protection to promote fair resolution of harassment claims.
This promotion of fairness in the resolution of sexual harassment
complaints would better advance the goals of Title VII, as it would
lessen the potential for resentment on the part of alleged harassers
and for criticism by society at large.74
VI. CONCLUSION

When Congress amended Title VII in 1991 to provide increased
remedies for sexual harassment, it accommodated the interests of
feminists in eliminating harassment from the workplace and effecting
a dramatic transformation of the interaction between men and women
in the workplace. Likewise, Congress continued to accommodate the
interests of employers in receiving a fair hearing before incurring any
penalty under the Act. Congress, however, overlooked the interests of
the workers at whom the statute was primarily directed. With EEOC
guidelines insulating employers from Title VII liability if they take
immediate action against alleged harassers, but mandating no proce-

173. See notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
174. See notes 161-70 and accompanying text.
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dures to protect alleged harassers, employers have a great incentive
to fire alleged harassers immediately and little incentive to invest
resources in investigation of charges and on-the-job reform. Because
at-will workers have no procedural protections to ensure a fair hearing when harassment allegations arise, they are especially vulnerable
to employers' efforts to insulate themselves by firing suspected
harassers.
With no opportunity to tell their side of the story and no guarantee of a reasonable investigation of the charges against them, workers fired for sexual harassment are more likely to consider themselves victims of the effort to eliminate sexual harassment than to
enthusiastically reform their behavior and attitudes. To prevent a
deepening of entrenched biases against women in the workplace
amongst alleged harassers and a shift in the public's focus from the
problem of sexual harassment to the injustice experienced by alleged
harassers, Congress must provide mandatory procedural protections
for alleged harassers to ensure that they are treated fairly. Only by
accommodating the interests of workers as they struggle to adopt the
new set of behavioral norms mandated by Title VII will Congress and
feminists achieve their long term goal of eliminating sexual harassment in the American workplace.
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